

The United Nations Security Council and Rwanda

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Introduction

Most of the controversy regarding the UN Security Council’s failure in Rwanda point to its shocking indifference, its sins of omission, and its failure to try and stop the killing despite the fact that it had a peacekeeping operation on the ground. Indeed, a review of the cable traffic, notes, interviews, and first-hand accounts of the UN’s decision making at the time reveals remarkably little interest in the civilian killings until the end of April, that is, after the Security Council decided to reduce its operation to a skeletal force. If the UN was not animated by the civilian killing, then what did receive its attention and why?

The early conventional wisdom was that the U.S. pressured the UN to withdraw, and was motivated by the “shadow” of Somalia and the lack of a vital national security interest in Rwanda. But while the U.S. was the most forceful advocate for ending the operation once the killing began, the archives suggest it did not encounter much resistance. Indeed, the reports from the Security Council during the month of April reveal an evolving consensus that the UN needed to withdraw from Rwanda. Different members of the Security Council had different reasons for coming to this conclusion, including: national interests (or rather a remarkable lack of any interest in Rwanda); a Security Council that had more on its plate than it could handle; an under equipped operation that could barely defend itself; the futile effort by the UN to find any additional troops and keep the ones that were still in country; and a fixation on the civil war and belief that achieving a cease-fire was the only way to halt the conflict. Several weeks of debate led the members of the Security Council to decide, some for pragmatic and others for principled reasons, that the reduction of UNAMIR was the least worst choice.

Because most of the cables, especially those after the start of the genocide, address different sets of interconnected issues, this briefing is organized in chronological fashion. I have chosen to focus on the sequence of conversations held at the Security Council between October 1993 and July 1994, beginning with the UN authorization of a peacekeeping force known as UNAMIR on October 5, 1993. Subsequent turning points include the the late March and early April debate regarding UNAMIR’s renewal (decided on April 4, 1994); the April 6 downing of President Habyarimana’s plane through the end of the evacuation of foreign personnel on April 11; the subsequent discussion regarding the future of UNAMIR that ended with the April 21 Security Council resolution reducing UNAMIR to a rump force and a restricted mandate; and the

post April 21 discussions regarding whether, when, and how the UN Security Council should respond to the apparent genocide. Part of the trick of reading the archival evidence, especially for the period after April 6, 1994, is being as attentive to what is not said just as much as what is said (the proverbial dogs that don't bark) and what gets the attention of the UNSC and what is relegated to the periphery.

Period One: October 5, 1993 – April 5, 1994

On October 5, 1993, the [UN Security Council passed Resolution 872](#). Despite many similarities with previous peacekeeping operations, the Rwanda resolution was adopted in a unique set of historical circumstances. To begin, it was authorized at a time when the United Nations had gone from being among the forlorn during the Cold War to getting all the world's attention afterwards. Specifically, Cold War politics had managed to paralyze the Security Council into a long period of dormancy, and the end of the Cold War led to a period of hyperactivity. More than double the number of operations were established between 1988 and 1993 than had been in the previous four decades. Moreover, it occurred just a day following the Blackhawk Down debacle (October 3-4) in Somalia, in the midst of continuing drama for the UN operation in the former Yugoslavia. The UN had not distinguished itself in either crisis, struggling not only with impossible circumstances but also the half-hearted actions of the permanent members of the Security Council. Unable to accomplish much on their own, the United States and Europe handed responsibility for Bosnia and Somalia over to the UN, but without sufficient resources and a highly restricted mandate. Furthermore, in Somalia the U.S. responded to its own botched operation by scapegoating the UN. After October 5, the mood at the United Nations turned even more gloomy, with everybody fixated on the reduced presence of American forces. These crises coincided with calls by key supporters of peacekeeping operations for wiser, more prudent, and conditional use of the UN's favorite instrument for conflict resolution. [Addressing the UN General Assembly on September 27, 1993](#), for example, President Clinton listed a set of questions the Security Council should ask before approving any more peacekeeping operations. In Clinton's words, “If the United States is going to say ‘yes’ to UN peacekeeping, then the United Nations must know when to say ‘no.’” In short, while the Rwanda operation authorized by UNSCR 872 might have seemed routine, it was authorized at a less than routine moment.

Given that the UN Security Council was already having difficulty managing its existing operations, and was being told to be more discriminating in the future, why did it authorize an operation in Rwanda? The advocates of the operation, including many key political figures in Rwanda and the French government, a powerful member of the Security Council, oversold the operation and the ease with which it could be accomplished. Rwanda ticked off all the necessary boxes. As far as the Security Council knew (and it didn't know much about Rwanda), the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Rwandan government, and their domestic political allies were committed to the Arusha Accords and a common vision of a post-conflict, multi-ethnic, democratic, nation. At least this is what they told the Security Council. The Security Council,

desperate for an easy victory to arrest its declining public image, bought the sales job. The [formal statements at the Security Council on October 5](#) give a hint of the promise of Rwanda, not the possible risks.

Moreover, the Security Council was determined to do Rwanda with as few resources and as little attention as possible, in line with the Security Council’s discerning attitude toward proposed operations and the promise of the Rwandan parties to avoid being much of a burden. Simply put, because this was supposed to be a nearly self-executing agreement and because the parties were committed to Arusha, the already over-committed Security Council decided to do Rwanda on the cheap. UNAMIR was deployed on a best case scenario that everything would go right. Although the advance team for the UN had originally proposed a six-month operating budget of \$51 million, which it openly worried at the time was dangerously underbudgeted, the [Security Council authorized only \\$38 million](#). By comparison, the defense budgets of the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany in 1994 were \$400 billion, and the total peacekeeping budget was [under one billion dollars](#). Yet, because of red tape at the UN, UNAMIR had to beg, borrow, and steal to get its budgeted funds and it operated on promissory notes for its first several months.

There would be no margin for error.

Soon after the UN authorized UNAMIR, and before there were even any peacekeeping troops on the ground, neighboring Burundi experienced its own spasm of ethnic conflict beginning on October 21. The trigger was the assassination of Burundi’s first democratically elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, by Tutsi extremists. The resulting violence left an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 dead. A [1996 UN report](#) concluded that “acts of genocide against the Tutsi minority were committed in Burundi in October 1993.” Burundi officials requested a UN presence to quell the violence, but the UN Security Council declined on the grounds that the conditions were not right: peacekeeping required a peace to keep, but there was no peace to keep, and so there would be no peacekeeping. The best that the UNSC could do was “remained seized of the matter.” The UNSC’s response to Burundi in October 1993 became something of a rehearsal for Rwanda in April 1994.

Like other peacekeeping operations, UNAMIR operated on a six-month mandate, but unlike previous operations, which are re-authorized without much discussion, the Security Council debates left UNAMIR’s future quite uncertain. The future of the peacekeeping operation was no longer purely contingent on a peace treaty and a stable cease-fire, but was also dependent on progress toward implementing the peace agreements. In short, the peacekeeping operation was treated as an implied contract between the UN and the recipient country: if Rwanda failed to keep its end of the bargain, the UN had the option of reconsidering its continued support. Arusha’s progress was dependent on the establishment of a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG), which, according to the peace treaty, was supposed to have been established months before. Six months on and countless delays later, Rwanda was still in a holding pattern. The parties’ failure to implement a new transitional government created the

impression that Arusha had been negotiated in bad faith or that the parties had buyer’s remorse. In either case, it suggested that the UN was stuck in Rwanda, forced to wait on the parties.

In fact, there was another option. At the outset of the negotiations for UNAMIR renewal in March several members of the Security Council, led by the United States, attempted to dispel the notion that peacekeeping operations were the gift that kept on giving. They insisted that renewal of the mandate should be conditional on whether Rwanda had also been keeping its end of the bargain. This provides the context for understanding [the cable](#) from USUN (U.S. Mission to the United Nations) to the State Department on March 23, 1994. Leading the charge, the U.S. linked renewal of the mandate to the immediate [formation of a broad-based transitional government](#). From the U.S. perspective, the threat to withdraw UNAMIR or impose a shorter renewal period was a necessary and winning strategy. It was one of the few levers at the disposal of the Security Council (presuming, of course, that the RPF, the Rwandan government, and its political allies saw withdrawal as a punishment and against their interests, which was not necessarily the case, particularly for extremist parties that were prepared to play the spoiler). If Rwanda did not move to create a new government, then the UN should take its resources and invest them elsewhere. Not only would Rwanda learn a valuable lesson, but so too would other laggard operations. And the U.S. could show to a hostile Congress that it could be tough on peacekeeping.

The subsequent informal negotiations at the UN revolved around the length of the leash the Council would decide to impose on Rwanda and the sincerity of individual Council members in implementing their withdrawal threats. The U.S. threat to withdraw UNAMIR in the absence of immediate progress on the formation of a broadly-based transitional government is reflected in [an April 4 memorandum](#) from the head of the department of peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. It is important to note that other members of the Council, including the United Kingdom, [shared the U.S. position](#).

On April 4, 1994, just as the initial authorization was about to expire, the UN Security Council renewed UNAMIR for a three month period (half the normal, six-month period), with an interim review to be conducted after six weeks. That same day President Habyarimana went to Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) to meet with Zairian President Mobutu, and subsequently headed to Dar es-Salaam for a one day meeting. This flurry of diplomatic activity, coinciding with the tough love message from the UN Security Council, fed hopeful speculations that the roadblocks to the implementation of Arusha were about to be removed. On Habyarimana’s return to Kigali the evening of April 6, his plane was shot out of the sky as it approached the airport, triggering the genocide.

Period Two: April 6-April 12, 1994

Two issues dominated the Security Council debates following the assassination of President Habyarimana on April 6. The first was the collapse of the cease-fire and the likely

return of civil war. From the point of view of the diplomats in New York, UNAMIR had been established to help maintain a cease fire and lead the country from civil war to a post-conflict state. When the violence erupted, this was the prism through which the Security Council viewed Rwanda. Moreover, there was the very real possibility of a return to civil war, and it was quite legitimate for the UN to do whatever it could to try and get the parties to return to their corners. Also, this is what the UN does: it arranges and oversees cease-fires. It does not do peace enforcement or the protection of civilians very well, as experience had shown on a daily basis in Bosnia. Given the underlying belief that the civil war was the cause of the civilian killings, it made logical sense to conclude that the killings could best be ended by ending the civil war and renewing the commitment to Arusha.

The other problem from the Security Council’s perspective was the safety of foreign nationals and UN personnel – to the clear neglect of civilians. This moral hierarchy of concern dominates the cable traffic, and the entire tone of the conversation is reflected in the [UK Mission’s cable of April 9, 1994](#). Council members were deeply concerned about the lives of peacekeepers. They were responsible for their security. Such concerns were not just imaginary but quite material – ten Belgian peacekeepers had been killed, their bodies mutilated beyond recognition and returned in a set of bloody sacks. The Council was worried not just about the peacekeepers in Rwanda but the possible impact if they did not do whatever they could to keep them safe. The UN’s ability to get countries to contribute troops to operations (including Rwanda) is dependent on evidence that they will look after them. The killing of the Belgian peacekeepers, followed by Belgium’s decision to remove its force, the backbone of the operation, raised questions about the ability of UNAMIR to protect itself. The mandate was over, and there was little for UNAMIR to do, except to try and negotiate a cease-fire and keep key Rwandan politicians from being assassinated.

When the Security Council was not worrying about its personnel, it was fretting over the evacuation of foreign nationals. Indeed, while UNAMIR was stretched thin, watching a good chunk of its force depart, trying to protect civilians when it could, and worried about its own survival, it was asked to devote resources to the evacuation of foreign nationals. In short, the Council’s focus during the first week was fixed on getting the combatants to return to their corners, getting foreign nationals out of Rwanda, and keeping UNAMIR personnel safe – crowding out any heightened concern on civilians.

When could UNAMIR use force? There was general agreement that UNAMIR could use force in self-defense, and presumably to protect foreign nationals and key Rwandan political figures. Most of those at the UN believed that UNAMIR was not authorized to use force to protect civilians, outside these narrow circumstances. But even if UNAMIR was legally authorized to use force, was it a good idea? The consensus was a resounding “no.” UNAMIR could barely defend itself, and could not take on the additional danger of trying to defend others. If it [did start protecting civilians](#), then it might also become a party to the conflict, that is, find itself in the thick of another Somalia. Contributing to these fears were threats by the Rwandan

Patriotic Front to treat the UN force as a combatant if its mandate was broadened to allow it to engage in combat operations of any kind. The UN Secretariat repeatedly reminded Dallaire that he was not authorized to use force except in self-defense. In its April 11 update to the Security Council, the Secretariat reported that [Dallaire doubted](#) that UNAMIR can play a supportive role and is “leaning toward recommending of UNAMIR’s evacuation.” At another moment in the Security Council, Annan’s top aide, Iqbal Riza, argued that the civilian killings should not be viewed as a failure of UNAMIR. After all, the “mandate of UNAMIR had never been to protect all civilians, but rather to [implement the Arusha agreement](#).”

One of the other salient conversations concerned whether UNAMIR’s mandate had disappeared now that the civil war appeared to have returned and the Arusha Accords were nullified. And, if it had, what would be UNAMIR’s role for the future? Although in many respects this discussion was premature given the existing flux on the ground, there was little taste from the UN for considering an expansion of UNAMIR’s size or mission. Riza, in fact, [informed the Security Council](#) that Dallaire “did not need additional troops under the present mandate.”

Period Three: April 12-21

Once the foreign nationals were evacuated, the Council’s debates turned to the future of UNAMIR. The archival evidence points to several defining elements in this conversation. To begin, different members of the UNSC launched a set of trial balloons. From the very beginning, and as evidenced by the UK’s cable of April 12, most discussion focused on [three options](#). One was the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR forces. This was the initial U.S. position, which it justified on the grounds that the UN had a responsibility to protect its peacekeepers, and, as it had predicted just weeks before, there was no justification for UNAMIR’s presence because there was no real commitment to the Arusha Accords. The United States kept delivering a big “I told you so” to the Security Council. At the other end, there were those who wanted to see a strengthened UNAMIR, with hints that it should protect civilians. This position was best represented by the [proposed resolution circulated by Nigeria](#) and supported by several other non-aligned members. Standing between this proposal and reality, however, was the fact that UNAMIR was getting smaller and weaker because of the Belgian departure, and no country was offering their troops for some ill-defined operation. This left option three – a stripped down presence with a mandate to try and negotiate a cease-fire between the parties. If this was the extent of UNAMIR’s involvement, then it did not need a lot of peacekeepers to do the job, just enough to support this diplomatic presence. Most Council members occupied this gray area during this time. The Council seems to be a holding pattern...

Council members waited, with growing frustration, for Boutros-Ghali to forward some concrete options. In crisis situations, and especially where the UN’s forces are the best eyes and ears on the ground (which was the case once the foreign nationals departed), the Security Council often waits to hear first from the UN Secretary-General before entering into a focused debate on next steps. Boutros-Ghali, though, failed to deliver any recommendations in a timely

manner. Indeed, in Europe at the time, the Secretary-General did not return until just before the April 21 vote. His absence had several effects: he was unable to directly participate in the debates; and it reinforced the emerging impression that the Secretary-General and the Secretariat was overwhelmed and paralyzed by the crisis.

And when it did talk about the future of UNAMIR, it never spoke of the possibility of a civilian protection mission. Instead, DPKO and the Secretary-General’s office kept repeating that because the situation in Rwanda was bleak and because its Force Commander was doubtful about UNAMIR’s capacity to protect itself or serve a useful function, the Secretary-General would, in all likelihood, recommend either reducing or completely withdrawing UNAMIR. In any event, [the archival record](#) from all sides is replete with a combination of hope that the Secretary General would deliver recommendations, rumors about what he might recommend, and the auditioning of different possible options by members of the Security Council. For instance, the Secretariat notes that when Nigeria decided to circulate its proposal on April 15, 1994, “many delegations insisted that the Secretariat present specific proposals for the Council consideration,” and noted that many [delegations were getting antsy](#). The U.S. Mission to the UN [records on April 14](#) that “the Secretariat was criticized for not presenting viable options. “ The representatives of the Secretary-General [explained](#) that they would try to present an options paper “on time,” but “could not promise...since the SYG [Boutros-Ghali] is traveling in Madrid.” The UK Ambassador [writes](#) that everyone was waiting for the Secretary-General to make a recommendation, which had been promised every day for over a week. Privately, though, the Secretary-General’s office [confided](#) that it would be impossible to maintain UNAMIR in its current condition. Eventually, the Security Council decided to act without waiting any longer for Boutros-Ghali, drifting toward the option that sat between complete withdrawal and the status quo – which also happened to be Boutros-Ghali’s [preferred position](#).

Why did the UNSC choose this “middle ground”? To completely withdraw would be a public relations disaster and difficult to justify as long as the UN was reinforcing the Bosnia mission (known as UNPROFOR) at the same time. To maintain the status quo also seemed untenable and needlessly exposed UN troops to danger without any purpose. To bolster forces, and perhaps give UNAMIR a civilian protection mission, was also seen as impractical, especially when Boutros-Ghali refused to recommend that option and Nigeria could not find any troops to make its proposal more than a wisp. So, drawing down the troops with a reduced mandate was the “bed that was just right.”

Yet an important part of the discussion in favor of reducing UNAMIR’s presence was principled and based on the emerging consensus regarding the conditions for peacekeeping. Specifically, an important dimension to the discussion was the related conversation regarding the conditions under which the Security Council should authorize and renew a peacekeeping operation. With the end of the Cold War, the UN got a reputation for never having met a potential operation it did not like. Such gluttony, though, caused many to worry that peacekeeping was about to die from exhaustion. Consequently, it was imperative for the UN to

determine when peacekeeping was the right tool for the job. By being more discriminating, the UN would make sure that when it authorized an operation it actually stood a chance of success. The United States was a forceful advocate for creating rules for peacekeeping. But it was a position that had broad support because of the fear that peacekeeping was about to be exploited to the point of extinction. Although not insensitive to the greater good argument, the Clinton administration had other reasons for wanting to cut peacekeeping down to its proper size. The U.S. paid nearly [one-third of the peacekeeping budget](#), and peacekeeping costs were rising almost at the same rate as healthcare and college tuition in the United States. Also, the Clinton administration, especially after Somalia, wanted to put as much distance between itself and the UN as a way of shielding itself from its Republican critics. As it happens, these discussions at the UN and in the U.S. coincided with the UN debates on Rwanda. Indeed, the year-long review of peacekeeping operations would become PDD-25 on May 3, 1994. When the U.S. tried to apply the new peacekeeping principles to Rwanda, from its perspective it was clear that peacekeepers had no business being in Rwanda.

Period Four: April 21 through July 19

Once the UN had decided to reduce its force to a token 250 with a highly limited mandate, the Security Council began to notice the civilian killings and wonder what, if anything to do about them.. Why did it take the UN so long to see the killings for the genocide that they were? To begin, there was the fog of war. Everyone knew that there were civilian killings, but their nature and cause remained unclear. The default position was that such tragic deaths were the natural consequence of the return to civil war. When UN officials worried about what would happen if the cease-fire broke down, they worried about a return to civil war. So, too, did the Security Council. So when the cease-fire broke down, they were primed to see the war as a civil war, and to see civilian deaths as a natural but unfortunate product of that war. Until late April, in fact, there did not exist sufficient counterevidence to demand a reinterpretation; it was not until April 19 that Human Rights Watch publically called the killings genocide. There also was the simple fact, especially the last week of April, that many officials were willfully blind – to see the genocide for what it was meant that they had to recognize the inappropriateness of their response. In short, they would have to do more. But the UNSC did not want to, or could not, do more.

Once the genocide became too obvious to ignore, the Security Council had to decide whether to actually speak its name. Often underappreciated was the extent to which many Council members did not want to say the word “genocide” because they did not want to have to take sides in the conflict. Part of the reason they wanted to avoid taking sides was the perception that neutrality was important for the protection of UNAMIR and its attempt to negotiate a cease-fire. On [April 27](#), for instance, the “Security Council members informally expressed some interest in perhaps urging the GOR [Rwandan government] to call for an end to the killing of civilians.” Strong stuff. To use the “G-word” meant acknowledging that something more had to be done –even if they did not think that something more could be done, at least effectively. By

the end of April, though, the world had nearly pronounced the Rwanda killings a genocide. The UN had to get on board or look like the stupidest and most callous kid in the international community. So it did. But then what?

Once the UN accepted that Rwanda was a genocide it could no longer respond with “business as usual,” that is, trying to seek a cease-fire. More had to be done. But what? There were two major constraints on any sort of civilian protection mission. The first was that there were no troops available. Sounding the genocide alarm did not lead any countries to change their mind on providing troops. Second, what would Council members do? In order to figure out what they would do, they had to know what was going on, but they had very little information regarding what was taking place on the ground. Moreover, given the reported nature of the killing, the UN forces would have to actively fight the Hutu militias and Rwandan army, which would make it a party to the war. But to be a party to the war would shatter the UN’s desire to retain its impartiality. Consequently, it spent a considerable amount of time discussing the possibility of an arms embargo, the importance of regional actors such as the Organization for African Unity, and nearly anything that would not require exposing the UN to actual combat. The [UK’s reporting cable](#) on April 29, 1994 crisply captures the rangy, and at times rambling, nature of the debate.

What is striking, in this regard, is what the UN focused on and what it neglected. It continued to insist on the need to find a cease-fire, even though a cease-fire was highly unlikely, especially once it was clear that the Tutsi-led RPF had the military upper hand. As a stopgap, some called for an arms embargo. But given the reported fact that most killing was occurring through machetes and other primitive weapons, an arms embargo was likely to have no effect whatsoever. The only way to stop the killing was to support the RPF, but this was not an option that anyone dared (or thought) to mention.

Given the lack of options and the desire to do something, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 918 on May 17 calling for a new peacekeeping force with a mandate to protect civilians. Now that a force had been authorized, the task came of trying to find and outfit the troops. No countries were willing to step up and into the genocide (and those that suggested that they might probably did not have the sort of personnel required to undertake such an operation). And those countries who said that they might show up also suggested that they would show up without much equipment, would need someone else to outfit them, and might be able to keep their material once they left. This also was the context for the episode in which the UN and the U.S. were engaged in weeks-long negotiations over the terms of lease for the necessary APCs or Armoured Personnel Carriers. The UN remained on the sidelines throughout. On July 19, 1994 the RPF declared victory ending the genocide, and, a few weeks later, when it was safe to come out again, UNAMIR II arrived in Rwanda.

Documents Referenced in this Essay
[Listed by date]

[Document 1](#)

Date: October 5, 1993

To: n/a

From: United Nations Security Council

Subject: UN Security Council Resolution 872

Cable #: S/RES/872 (1993)

[Document 2](#)

Date: October 5, 1993

To: n/a

From: United Nations Security Council

Subject: Provisional Verbatim Record of the three-Thousand Two Hundred and Eighty-Eighth Meeting

Cable #: S/PV.3288

[Document 3](#)

Date: January 24, 1994

To: SecState Washington DC

From: AmEmbassy Kigali [Rwanda]

Subject: UNAMIR's Budget Problems - Operating in the Red

Cable #: Kigali 00336

[Document 4](#)

Date: March 23, 1994

To: SecState Washington DC

From: US Mission to the UN (USUN), New York

Subject: Discussions on Rwanda Mandate and New SRSG [Special Representative to the Secretary General] to Zaire

Cable #: USUN 01187

[Document 5](#)

Date: April 4, 1994

To: [Special Representative to the Secretary General, Jacques Roger] Booh Booh/ [Force Commander, General Roméo] Dallaire, UNAMIR, Kigali

From: [Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, Kofi] Annan, UNations, New York

Subject: Extension of UNAMIR

Cable #: 950

[Document 6](#)

Date: April 6, 1994

To: FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office]

From: UK Mission, New York

Subject: [United Nations Security Council Adoption of Resolution 909]

Cable #: 1216

[Document 7](#)

Date: April 8, 1994

To: The Secretary-General [Boutros Boutros-Ghali], Geneva

From: [Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, Kofi] Annan, UNations, New York

Subject: Rwanda

Cable #: 1050

[Document 8](#)

Date: April 9, 1994

To: FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office]

From: UK Mission, New York

Subject: Rwanda

Cable #: 1284

[Document 9](#)

Date: April 9, 1994

To: [Special Representative to the Secretary General, Jacques Roger] Booh Booh/ [Force Commander, General Roméo] Dallaire, UNAMIR, Kigali

From: [Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, Kofi] Annan, UNations, New York

Subject: Franco-Belgian Evacuation Operation/Security Council Consultations

Cable #: 1060

[Document 10](#)

Date: April 11, 1994

To: Ambassador [Edward] Walker [Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN]

From: Robert T. Grey [Counselor for Political Affairs of the US Mission to the UN]

Subject: Security Council informals on Rwanda, 11:00, Monday, April 11

Cable #: n/a

[Document 11](#)

Date: April 12, 1994

Michael Barnett, June 1, 2014

“The United Nations Security Council in Rwanda,” *International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide*

To: Ambassador [Edward] Walker [Deputy Permanent Representative of the US Mission to the UN]

From: Robert T. Grey [Counselor for Political Affairs of the US Mission to the UN]

Subject: Security Council informals on Rwanda, 3:30, Tuesday, April 12

Cable #: n/a

[Document 12](#)

Date: April 12, 1994

To: FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office]

From: UK Mission, New York

Subject: Rwanda

Cable #: 1295

[Document 13](#)

Date: April 13, 1994

To: [Special Representative to the Secretary General, Jacques Roger] Booh Booh/ [Force Commander, General Roméo] Dallaire, UNAMIR, Kigali

From: [Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, Kofi] Annan, UNations, New York

Subject: UNAMIR

Cable #: 1115

[Document 14](#)

Date: April 13, 1994

To: Secretary-General [Boutros Boutros-Ghali], Madrid

From: [Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, Kofi] Annan, UNations, New York

Subject: Rwanda

Cable #: 1117

[Document 15](#)

Date: April 14, 1994

To: FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office]

From: UK Mission, New York

Subject: [Text of NAM Draft]

Cable #: 1342

[Document 16](#)

Date: April 14, 1994

To: SecState Washington DC

From: US Mission to the UN (USUN), New York

Subject: TFRWOL: Still No Security Council Action, 4/13

Cable #: USUN 01553

[Document 17](#)

Date: April 14, 1994

To: The Secretary [of State, Warren Christopher]

From: Douglas J. Bennet [Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs]

Subject: Final Approval of the Peacekeeping PDD

Cable #: n/a

[Document 18](#)

Date: April 15, 1994

To: FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office]

From: UK Mission, New York

Subject: Rwanda

Cable #: 1364

[Document 19](#)

Date: April 20, 1994

To: FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office]

From: UK Mission, New York

Subject: Rwanda

Cable #: 1410

[Document 20](#)

Date: April 21, 1994

To: FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office]

From: UK Mission, New York

Subject: Rwanda

Cable #: 1434

[Document 21](#)

Date: April 22, 1994

To: FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office]

From: UK Mission, New York

Subject: Rwanda

Cable #: 1445

[Document 22](#)

Date: April 27, 1994

To: SecState Washington DC

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“The United Nations Security Council in Rwanda,” *International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide*

From: US Mission to the UN (USUN), New York
Subject: UNSC Activity on Rwanda
Cable #: USUN 01776

[Document 23](#)

Date: April 29, 1994
To: FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office]
From: UK Mission, New York
Subject: Rwanda
Cable #: 1538

[Document 24](#)

Date: August 22, 1996
To: n/a
From: United Nations Security Council [posted on U.S. Institute of Peace website]
Subject: [International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi: Final Report]
Cable #: S/1996/682